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CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-709
& CV-99-752

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS

IN RE: MICROSOFT ANTITRUST
LITIGATION

The defendant moves for judgm ent on the pleadings. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(c);
C unningham v. H a za , 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988).

The defendant argues that

because its allegedly w rongful conduct took place outside of Maine, the plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under M aine's antitrust
statute. 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 et seq (1997). For the following reasons, the defendant's
motion is denied.
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
M aine's Mini-Sherman Act provides
Every contract, com bination in the form of trusts or otherw ise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce uVthis State, is declared to
be illegal___
10 M.R.S.A. § 1101 (emphasis added). Similarly, § 1102 provides
W hoever shall m onopolize or attem pt to m onopolize or combine or
conspire w ith any other person or persons to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce of this State shall be guilty of a Class C crime.
10 M.R.S.A. § 1102 (emphasis added).
Statutory construction is a m atter of law. Home Builders Ass'n of Maine, Inc^
v. Town of Eliot, 2000 ME 82, <2 4, 750 A.2d 566, 569. The plain m eaning of the
statutory language is the prim ary m eans of determ ining legislative intent. IcL In
1
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these two statutory sections, the phrases "in this State" and "of this State" modify
"trade or commerce" and not the illegal conduct.

See OCE Printing Svs. USA, Inc, v.

Mailers Data Servs., Inc., 760 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting
Florida antitrust statu te12 to regulate trade or commerce that occurs in Florida
regardless where the contract, conspiracy or monopoly occurs); Health Consultants,
Inc, v. Precision Instrum ents, Inc., 527 N.W .2d 596, 606 (Neb. 1995) (holding that
Nebraska antitrust statute- applies to extraterritorial conduct when the monopolistic
conduct affects consumers w ithin the state); see also In re Brand N am e Prescription
Drugs A ntitrust Li tig.. 123 F.3d 599, 613 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding th at Alabama
antitrust statute3 is not lim ited to purely intrastate commerce).4 In considering the

iThe Florida statute provides: "Every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce in this state is unlawful." Fla. Stat . ch. 542.18 (1997).
2The Nebraska statute provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, within this state, is hereby declared to be illegal." NEB.
REV. StaT. § 59-801 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Regular Sess.).
3The Alabama statute provides: "Any person, firm, or corporation injured or damaged by an
unlawful trust, combine or monopoly, or its effect direct or indirect, may, in each instance of such injury
or damage, recover the sum of 3500 ..." A la . CODE § 6-5-60 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Regular
Sess.).
4Cases relied on by the defendant can be distinguished. The 1903 Illinois case cited involved
discussion of an Illinois statute passed in 1891 and since repealed. The c o u t I confined the statute to "its
legitimate constitutional scope" and determined that it would exclude acts connected to any pool, trust,
or combination formed outside the state "and which would violate the anti-trust statute of the U nited
States." See,
Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 66 N.E. 349, 353 (111. 1903); 1891 111. Laws 121
1/2,301 repealed by 740 ILL. COMP. Stat. 10/7.9 (1993).*
In Arnold v. M icrosoft, the court noted that the Kentucky legislature had not enacted legislation
covering indirect purchasers. The court was unw illing to infringe on the legislative prerogative:
"(a)nticcmpetitive acts performed largely or totally out of state, against third parties, causing injury to
Kentucky residents ... do not w arrant such judicial intervention." Arnold v. Microsoft, No. 00-CI-Q0123,
slip op. at 5-6 (Jefferson Circuit Court, Division Eleven July 21, 2000). The court also noted that the
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Alabama antitrust statute, the Seventh Circuit observed that
[i]f the statute is lim ited today as it once was to commerce that is not
within the regulatory pow er of Congress under the commerce clause, it
is a dead letter because there are virtually no sales, in Alabam a or
anyw here else in the U nited States, that are intrastate in th at sense.
O ther states read their a n titru st statutes to reach w hat is now
understood to be interstate commerce. The reading is constitutionally
perm issible and we are given no reason to suppose that Alabama
w ould buck this trend and by doing so kill its statute.
Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Because the statutory language is not ambiguous, it is unnecessary to examine
other indicia of legislative intent. See Home Builders. 2000 ME 82, "fl 4, 650 A.2d at
569.

If the legislative history is examined, however, it supports the conclusion that

the plaintiffs can proceed w ith their claim.

It is clear that the initial legislative

concern w as prim arily with the problem of intrastate m onopolies because federal
law could not reach such illegal conduct. See, e.g., R.S. ch. 266, § 1 (1899); Legis. Ree.
55-56 (1913) (statem ent of Senator Hersey); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997);
Addvston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 247 (1899).
The original statute provided
It shall be unlaw ful for any firm or incorporated com pany, or any
num ber of firm s or incorporated companies, or any unincorporated
statutory language, "[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade o r commerce in this
Com m onwealth shall be unlawful," required that the bad acts must have occurred in Kentucky. IdL slip
op. at 13.
In Abbott L aboratories, the court examined the legislative history since 1S91 of Alabama's antitrust
statutes and concluded that the reach of the statutes was no greater in 1999 than when enacted. Abbott
Laboratories v. Durrett. 746 So.2d 316. 339 (Ala. 1999). The court did not rely on the language of the
statute. See id. at 318.

3
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com pany, or association of persons or stockholders, organized for the
purpose of m anufacturing, producing, refining or mining any article or
product which enters into general use or consumption by the people, to
form or organize any trust, or to enter into any combination of firms . .

R.S. ch. 266, § 1 (1899). The legislature subsequently enacted the original versions of
sections 1101 and 1102 in 1913. See R.S. ch. 106, § 1 (1913).
Because the statute has since been addressed by the legislature, the inquiry is
not confined to circumstances in 1913. See Pelletier v. Fort Kent Golf C lub, 662 A.2d
220, 223 n.5 (Me. 1995) (legislative history of prior statute does not control
interpretation of statutory language subsequently enacted). A lthough the language
of sections 1101 and 1102 rem ains as enacted in 1913, the subsequent enactments
m ust be considered.

See Estate of Tacobs. 1998 ME 233, *2 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524

(interpreting statute requires consideration of "the whole statutory scheme of which
the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presum ably the intent
of the Legislature, may be achieved").
In 1977, the legislature am ended the Maine antitrust act to m ake a violation
of the act a Class C crime and to provide for treble damages. See 10 M.R.S-A. §§ 1101,
1102 & 1104. As stated by one legislator, the purpose of these amendments was to
"give g reater p ro tectio n to the sm all businessm en, against the out-of-state
corporations . . . . " 1 Legis. Rec. 633 (1977) (statement of Senator Conley); see LcL at
634 (statem ent of Senator Merrill).
Between the enactm ent date and the effective date of that am endm ent, the
U-S- Suprem e Court determ ined that the Sherman Act did not authorize indirect
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purchaser lawsuits. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S- 720, 729 (1977). In
1989, the U.S. Suprem e C ourt determ ined that states could authorize indirect
purchaser law suits in the context of state antitrust statutes. See California v. ARC
America Corp.. 490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989).
In Maine, the passage of the Illinois Brick repealer in 1989 provided th at new
cause of action for indirect purchasers. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104(1). Its passage reveals a
legislative intent to fill the gap outlined in Illinois Brick that prohibited indirectpurchaser suits and to reach interstate conduct affecting trade or commerce in
Maine. See L.D. 1653, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989) (specifically m entioning
California v. ARC America Corp and noting that a state m ay enact a law making the
m anufacturer liable to the indirect purchaser); see also Em ereencv One, Inc, v.
W aterous Co., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 964 (E.D. Wis. 1998) ("[T]he best indication that
state legislators . . . meant to hold interstate actors accountable in certain situations . .
. m ay be . . . the much-discussed inclusion of an indirect purchaser claim.").
In their complaint, the plaintiffs have stated a claim for w hich relief can be
granted under M aine's antitrust statutes. See Cunningham , 538 A.2d at 267.
The entry is
The Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
DENIED.

Date: March 24, 2001
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December 5, 2000

Sally Bourget, Clerk
Cumberland County Superior Court
Cumberland County Courthouse
142 Federal Street
PO Box 287
Portland, Maine 04112-0287
Re:

IN RE MICROSOFT
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
Docket No.’s CV-99-709 & CV-99-752

Dear Ms. Bourget:
Enclosed for filing in the above case please find the Maine Attorney General’s
Application to Intervene and Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae, with attachments.
Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ubu\
FRANCIS ACKERMAN
Chief, Public Protection Division
FA/kesp
Enclosures
pc:
Robert Mittel, Esq.
Joanne Cicala, Esq.
Randall Weill, Esq.
David B. Tulchin, Esq.
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STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, SS.

IN RE MICROSOFT
ANTITRUST LITIGATION

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NOS. CV-99-709
& CV-99-752
)
)
)

APPLICATION OF MAINE
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
INTERVENE AS AMICUS CURIAE

The Maine Attorney General now applies to intervene in this litigation pursuant to
M.R.Civ.P. Rule 24 for the limited purpose of filing a memorandum of law as amicus curiae to
address a novel issue raised by Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s pending Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. Microsoft Corporation challenges the applicability of Maine’s mini-Sherman
Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 et seq., to conduct which, while occurring entirely outside Maine’s
borders, is alleged to have caused anticompetitive effects within the State.
The Attorney General, as the agency charged with antitrust enforcement duties under
Maine law, respectfully begs leave to be heard on this issue as amicus curiae. Microsoft’s
argument contradicts a decade of established jurisprudence. Moreover, if adopted as the law of
this State, Microsoft’s interpretation of the statute would drastically narrow the scope of the state
antitrust enforcement, as well as the scope of antitrust relief available to the State and Maine
consumers. The importance of the issue addressed, and the Attorney General’s interest therein,
appear more fully in the memorandum of law submitted herewith for the Court’s consideration.

ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

FRANCIS ACKERMAN
Chief, Public Protection Unit
Six State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333
(207) 626 8800
Bar No. 2125

STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, SS.

IN RE MICROSOFT
ANTITRUST LITIGATION

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NOS. CV-99-709
& CV-99-752

)
)
)

MAINE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW AS
AMICUS CURIAE

The Maine Attorney General begs leave to submit this memorandum of law as amicus
curiae to address a novel issue raised by Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) in the context of
its pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Microsoft challenges the applicability of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§
1101 et seq., to conduct which, while physically occurring outside Maine’s borders, is
nevertheless alleged to have caused anticompetitive effects within the State. Indeed, Microsoft
maintains that only conduct of a purely intrastate nature falls within the purview of the statute.
This position, however, would contradict more than a decade of established state antitrust
jurisprudence, and is founded on erroneous premises.
The Attorney General is the agency charged with antitrust enforcement duties under
Maine’s mini-Sherman Act. In addition, the Attorney General represents the State in its
proprietary capacity in antitrust suits, and represents Maine consumers in such suits in his role as
parens patriae. We view this issue as a matter of deep concern. If Microsoft’s interpretation of
the statute should prevail, the scope of the state antitrust enforcement, as well as the scope of
antitrust relief available to the State and Maine consumers, would narrow drastically.

In Re Microsoft Antitrust Litigation

Maine Attorney General’s Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae
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I.

INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiffs in this class action are Maine purchasers of computer systems manufactured by
Microsoft. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they have paid higher prices for Microsoft
products than they otherwise would have as a result of certain conduct by Microsoft which, they
charge, constitutes both unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization in violation of the
Maine mini-Sherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 & 1102. Although the Complaint does not say
so, the lawsuit is brought pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104, which provides, in pertinent part, that
“[a]ny person ... injured directly or indirectly in its business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section 1101,1102 ...
may sue for the injury in a civil action” (emphasis added). The Plaintiff class in this action
presumably consists largely (if not entirely) of indirect purchasers (i.e., those who purchased
Microsoft systems from third parties rather than directly from Microsoft).
As defined in the Complaint, the Plaintiff class is limited to Maine-domiciled individuals
and entities. Further, Plaintiffs’ proof may be expected to show that Microsoft products are
widely available for purchase in Maine, and that at least some (no doubt most) of Plaintiffs’
purchases of Microsoft products were consummated in Maine. If it is assumed, for purposes of
the pending motion, that the allegations of the Complaint are true, there appears to be no dispute
between the parties with respect to two propositions: (1) the conduct attributed to Microsoft
occurred entirely outside Maine; and (2) that conduct resulted in anticompetitive effects harmful
to purchasers within the State.
Against this background, Microsoft’s pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
raises a single issue. Microsoft argues that Maine’s mini-Sherman Act by its terms does not

In Re Microsoft Antitrust Litigation

Maine Attorney General’s Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae
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apply to conduct.which occurs outside the State, even if the anticompetitive harm resulting from
that conduct is felt within the State.
In advancing this argument, Microsoft relies straightforwardly on the statutory provisions
which respectively prohibit (1) “every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce in this State” (§ 1101) (emphasis added); and (2) monopolization (or
attempts to monopolize) “any part of the trade or commerce of this State” (§ 1102) (emphasis
added). Microsoft reads this language to limit the purview of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act to
conduct which occurs entirely within the State. There is no contention that this interpretation of
the statute is required by any federal constitutional or statutory provision. Instead, Microsoft
relies exclusively on the language and legislative history of the statute itself. The issue presented
is therefore one of simple statutory construction.
In the sections below, we explain that the plain language of the statute clearly authorizes
suits, like the present litigation, by Maine indirect purchasers damaged by a manufacturer’s
conduct occurring outside the State. Under accepted canons of statutory construction, that plain
language controls. Even if it is nevertheless deemed appropriate to excavate the legislative
history of the relevant enactments, we submit that nothing in that history compels a contrary
result. Moreover, the Attorney General’s longstanding interpretation of a statute he is mandated
to enforce, which here squarely supports Plaintiffs’ position, is entitled to some measure of
judicial deference. Finally, it bears consideration that a grant of Microsoft’s pending motion
would drastically narrow the scope of state antitrust enforcement as well as the scope of antitrust
relief available to the State and to Maine consumers.

In Re Microsoft Antitrust Litigation

Maine Attorney General’s Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae
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II.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF MAINE’S MINI-SHERMAN ACT
AUTHORIZES SUITS BY MAINE INDIRECT PURCHASERS DAMAGED
BY A MANUFACTURER’S CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE STATE.

The language of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act is unambiguous. “Any person injured
directly or indirectly” by conduct violative of sections 1101 or 1102 “may sue for the injury.”
Under section 1101
Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce in this State is declared to be illegal.
Clearly, the sale of computer systems to individuals and entities domiciled in Maine, especially
when such sales are consummated in Maine, constitutes trade or commerce “in this State.”
Moreover, regardless of the location where it is entered upon, a contract or combination which
damages Maine indirect purchasers by causing them to pay supracompetitive prices for computer
systems certainly affects trade and commerce in this State adversely, i.e., restrains it. Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 1314 (defining “restraint of trade” to include practices which
“hamper or obstruct the course of trade or commerce as it would be carried on if left to the
control of natural economic forces,” including practices which “affect prices ... to [the]
detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods”; citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 [1940]).
Similarly, section 1102 unambiguously declares:
Whoever shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine
and conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce of this State shall be guilty of a Class
C crime.
Again, it can hardly be denied that the sale of computer systems in Maine constitutes a part of
the trade or commerce “of this State.” Moreover, as in section 1101, the phrase “in this state” or
“of this state” modifies “trade or commerce” rather than the targeted conduct.

In Re Microsoft Antitrust Litigation

Maine Attorney General’s Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae
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In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege monopolization of a worldwide market, by means of
conduct which, for example, inhibited the development of competing products. Amended Class
Action Complaint f l 19, 26. Maine is, of course, part of this worldwide market. Surely, wherever
perpetrated, conduct which inhibits competing products from reaching this worldwide market,
including Maine, operates to monopolize a part of the trade or commerce “of this State.”
Accordingly, the plain language of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act, on its face, authorizes
suits by Maine indirect purchasers damaged by a manufacturer's conduct outside the State. The
situs of the conduct complained of is quite irrelevant, provided that the conduct has the effect of
restraining or monopolizing trade or commerce in Maine. Put differently, conduct that restrains
or monopolizes a wholesale market also inevitably restrains or monopolizes downstream retail
markets. Since restraint and monopolization of trade and commerce in Maine is squarely alleged
on the face of the Complaint, Microsoft’s motion necessarily fails.
Ignoring the plain language of the statute, Microsoft’s motion is built on a precarious
foundation consisting of carefully selected excerpts from the legislative archaeology of various
enactments dating back to 1913. This approach is impermissible, since, in the absence of
ambiguity, the plain language of the statute is controlling. Home Builders Association o f Maine,
Inc. v. Town of Eliot, 2000 ME 82, 750 A.2d 566, 569 (court will look to legislative history only
where ambiguity exists); Dunelawn Owners Association v. Gendreau, 2000 ME 94, 750 A.2d
591, 595 (where plain language resolves issue, court will not attempt to infer contrary legislative
intent). However, even if Microsoft’s resort to legislative history were appropriate, it would still
be unavailing, for the reasons explained below.

In Re Microsoft Antitrust Litigation

Maine Attorney General’s Memorandum o f Law as Amicus Curiae
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III.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MAINE’S MINI-SHERMAN ACT
DOES NOT IN ANY EVENT SUPPORT MICROSOFT’S RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF ITS APPLICABILITY.

Microsoft’s attempt to limit the applicability of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act to purely
intrastate conduct is founded primarily on excerpts from legislative debate which preceded the
original enactment of sections 1101 and 1102 in 1913. The Legislature has, of course, revisited
the statute on several subsequent occasions.
The present litigation is an indirect purchaser class action, brought pursuant to an
amendment to section 1104 which was passed in 1989. P.L. 1989 ch. 367. In construing the
statute as a harmonious whole, see Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, 719 A.2d 523, 524, it
behooves us to begin by examining the intent of this more recent enactment.
A.

Maine’s Illinois Brick Repealer Was Broadly Intended To Afford
Redress To Maine Indirect Purchasers For Overcharges Traceable to
Manufacturer Misconduct Outside. As Well As Within the State.

The indirect purchaser amendment, enacted without floor debate in 1989, “amend[ed]
Maine law to provide Maine citizens and corporations with a right to sue a manufacturer for
damages suffered as a result of a manufacturer’s violation of state antitrust laws, regardless of
whether the citizens or corporations are direct or indirect purchasers from the defendant.” L.D.
1653, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989). Consistent with this expansive explanation, nothing
in the enactment itself, or in the supporting presentation of Commissioner (now Senator) Susan
Collins suggested for a moment that the purpose was to provide a remedy only for restraints or
monopolizations of trade accomplished by means of purely intrastate conduct.

In Re Microsoft Antitrust Litigation
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To the contrary, both the Statement of Fact and the Commissioner’s testimony1
expounded the significance of the indirect purchaser amendment in terms of its jurisprudential
context. Specifically, a decade prior to the enactment, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that
indirect purchaser lawsuits were not authorized by the federal Sherman Act. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Thus, while direct purchasers could sue under federal law for
antitrust injury, indirect purchasers damaged by pass-through overcharges could not. Although a
few states legislatively authorized indirect purchaser suits under state antitrust statutes by means
of so called “Illinois Brick repealers”, doubts persisted as to the constitutionality of the repealer
provision. Those doubts were resolved by California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93
(1989), which made clear that states were free to provide redress to indirect purchasers in the
context of state antitrust statutes.
As both the Statement of Fact and the Commissioner’s testimony emphasize, L.D. 1653
was proposed and enacted in response to ARC America’s invitation, as Maine’s Illinois Brick
repealer. Very simply, the new law was intended to provide to Maine indirect purchasers the
remedy denied them under the federal Sherman Act by Illinois Brick, namely, a right to sue
manufacturers to recover overcharges incurred as an indirect result of the manufacturer’s
anticompetitive conduct.
If the bill’s sponsors or Commissioner Collins had believed they were proposing to
provide a remedy to indirect purchasers which permitted recovery of overcharges only where
those overcharges were incurred as a result of anticompetitive conduct perpetrated by businesses
or persons physically located in Maine, such a drastic limitation would surely have been
explicitly noted. Indeed, with manufacturing in Maine in steep decline over the past half
t

Copies o f the L.D. and the Commissioner’s testimony are attached.
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century, it seems fair to suggest that such a limitation might well have reduced the utility of the
amendment to the vanishing point.
In amending section 1104, then, the 1989 Maine Legislature obviously intended to allow
suits by or on behalf of Maine indirect purchasers against out-of-state manufacturers on the basis
of their conduct outside (as well as within) the State, to the extent that its harmful effects were
felt by persons within Maine. Since the Legislature enacted no simultaneous amendments to
sections 1101 and 1102, it must have believed that these provisions were already broad enough
to reach such extraterritorial conduct.
Moreover, it is equally clear that this belief was already current at least a dozen years
earlier, when the Legislature acted to revitalize then-moribund state antitrust enforcement by
increasing the penalties which could be brought to bear for violation of sections 1101 and 1102.
P.L. 1977 ch. 175, enacting L.D. 347 as amended (108th Legis. 1977). As Senator Conley stated
in support of the bill: “This law is going to give greater protection to the small businessman
against the out-of-state corporations, which are the least likely to share our ethics.” Legis. Rec.
633 (1977). Microsoft’s argument is thus at odds not only with the plain language of sections
1101 and 1102, but also with the Legislature’s own understanding of the scope of these
provisions, as evidenced in the legislative history of subsequent amendatory enactments, first in
1977, then again in 1989.
Importantly, Arnold v. Microsoft, Jefferson Circuit Court, Division Eleven, No. 00-CI00123 (Opinion and Order dated July 21, 2000) (appended to Microsoft brief at Tab G), cited by
Microsoft, actually supports our contention that the primary purpose of indirect purchaser

2

Copies o f these materials are attached to Microsoft’s Motion.
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statutes is to expand the scope of state antitrust law to include conduct with extraterritorial
origins. In Arnold, Judge McDonald-Burkman clearly understood that if Kentucky had enacted
an Illinois Brick repealer statute such as Maine’s, private plaintiffs would have been able to sue
for “[ajnticompetitive acts performed largely or totally out o f state, against third parties, causing
injury to Kentucky residents . . . Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Because Kentucky law (unlike
that in Maine) does not expressly authorize indirect purchaser suits, the court dismissed
plaintiffs’ claim, noting pointedly that the Kentucky legislature had had two decades in which to
add indirect purchaser language (as Maine did) but failed to do so. Id. This Kentucky case thus
confirms the obvious —that indirect purchaser legislation such as Maine’s 1989 amendments are
intended to remedy monopolistic conduct at the wholesale level because that conduct inevitably
distorts in-state markets, regardless of whether such conduct occurred inside the state or
elsewhere.3

3 In addition to Maine, other states to explicitly repeal the Illinois Brick rule to allow private indirect purchaser
actions include California, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997); Wisconsin, WIS. ST AT. ANN. §
133.18(1) (a) (West 1989); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3 (Michie 1995); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 445.778(2) (1989); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (West 1995); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-801(b) (1994); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (Michie 1994); the District o f Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-4509 (1996); and North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-08.1-08(3)- (4) (1989). Other
states have enacted more limited provisions: Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 1993) (allowing
only attorney general suits on behalf o f indirect purchasers, see Gaebler v. New Mexico Potash Corp., 676 N.E.2d
228,221 (111. App. Ct. 1996)); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11- 209(b)(2)(ii) (1990) (allowing
government suits); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (1992) (allowing parens patriae action with set-off
for previously awarded damages); and Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-14(a), (b) & (c) (1993) (allowing attorney
general suits and nonclass indirect purchaser actions for single damages).In addition, some state courts have even
interpreted their pre-Illinois Brick consumer protection and antitrust statutes to allow private indirect purchaser
actions. In some o f these cases the allegedly anticompetitive conduct occurred primarily outside the state. See, e.g.,
Hyde v. Abbott Labs., 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 478 S.E.2d 5 (N.C. 1996) (interpreting state
counterpart o f Sherman Act to authorize indirect purchaser suits); McLaughlin v. Abbott Labs., No. CV 95-0628
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Yavapai Co. July 9, 1996) (same); Blake v. Abbott Labs., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 71,369
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1996) (same); Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So.2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(interpreting state deceptive practices act to authorize indirect purchaser suits).
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Against this background, Microsoft’s heavy reliance on legislative pronouncements
concerning the original versions of sections 1101 and 1102, as enacted in 1913, is far from
compelling.
B.

The Legislative History of the 1913 Enactment Is Ambiguous.

Upon careful examination, the legislative discussion preceding the 1913 enactment does
not support Microsoft’s contention that the Legislature clearly intended to exclude from its
purview conduct by entities not located in Maine even where the inevitable results of that
conduct significantly impact Maine consumers. Certainly it is possible, as Microsoft has done,
to highlight carefully selected excerpts inferentially supporting its restrictive interpretation of the
statute. However, it is significant that all of the legislative debate cited by Microsoft focussed on
a proposal to conduct an investigation of the coal trade in Maine, and preceded the drafting (and
therefore could not have construed) the language of the bill which was ultimately enacted and
codified in sections 1101 and 1102. The unexpurgated record, accordingly, presents a much more
complex, finely nuanced picture than the one painted by Microsoft. Ultimately, given its full
context, the history of the 1913 enactment supports a more expansive view of the underlying
legislative purpose.
Maine’s original antitrust law was enacted in 1889, a decade before the federal Sherman
Act. P.L. 1889 ch. 266. In pertinent part, this statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any firm or incorporated company, or any
number of firms or incorporated companies, or any unincorporated
company, or association of persons or stockholders, organized for
the purpose of manufacturing, producing, refining or mining any
article or product which enters into general use or consumption by
the people, to form or organize any trust, or to enter into any
combination of firms....
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By 1913, however, concerns had arisen that this original antitrust provision was too
narrow in scope. In particular, a harsh winter and soaring coal prices statewide led Senator
Morey of Androscoggin to call for an investigation. Senator Morey presented anecdotal
evidence suggesting that the price spikes were caused by a territorial allocation agreement
among coal dealers in Maine. Legis. Rec. 53 -54 (1913). Other legislators were skeptical.
Senator Steams of Oxford, for example, believed it far more likely that the high prices Maine
was experiencing had their source at the minehead in Pennsylvania, or elsewhere “far beyond the
confines of Maine,” and thus “far beyond the reach of any investigation which we may be able to
have set in motion.” In Senator Steams’ view, the logistics and expense of such a far-ranging
investigation were “a matter more properly to be handled by the federal government.” Id. 52.
Senator Hersey of Aroostook was also concerned that Maine’s 1889 antitrust law was not
broad enough to reach the conduct on which the investigation would focus.
Coal is not a product that is mined or refined or manufactured in
the State of Maine, therefor[e] it does not come under the trust
laws of Maine, and [under the 1889 law] we have no authority over
any combination that is formed outside the State of Maine for the
purpose of mining or manufacturing coal.
Id. 55. Senator Hersey was rightly concerned that, because the 1889 law applied solely to
manufacturers, refineries and mining companies, Maine antitrust enforcement could not reach
anticompetitive conduct among coal dealers within the State. He also seems to have held the
view that the 1889 law could not reach a combination formed outside the state, in all likelihood
because the language of the relevant provision took the form of a regulation of the ability of
persons within the state to enter into certain types of business organization.
In response to these concerns regarding the limitations of the 1889 law, the Legislature
undertook to broaden the scope of state antitrust enforcement. Indeed, in Senator Morey’s view,
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the central purpose of the proposed investigation was to offer recommendations in this regard.
On this basis, he won an expression of “warm support” from Senator Hersey. Id. 55 -56.
Accordingly, the investigation was authorized and conducted by a legislative committee
chaired by Senator Morey. In its extensive report, the committee concluded:
[n]ot only the mine owners and middlemen or brokers, but also the
retailers, have been sharers in a greater or less degree in this
increased cost of coal to the consumer. . . . the statutes of this
State prohibiting combinations and agreements in [restraint] of
trade are very limited in their scope, and to end of providing
adequate legislation to prevent all future agreements and
combination of every kind in the nature of monopolies or in
restraint of trade, your committee presents herewith the
accompanying bill. . . .
L.D. 479 (76th Legis. 1913) at 25 (emphasis added).4 Of concern to the committee,
therefore, were combinations among mine owners, middlemen and brokers out-of-state, as well
as among retailers within the State. The committee’s goal, as far as possible, was “to prevent all
future agreements and combinations of every kind in the nature of monopolies or in restraint of
trade.” From this expansive language, it seems eminently fair to conclude that the legislative
purpose in 1913 in enacting the Morey bill, whose language survives today in sections 1101 and
1102, was to broaden and lengthen the reach of Maine antitrust enforcement both within and
outside the state. L.D. 464 (76th Legis. 1913), enacted as P.L. 1913 ch. 106.
At a minimum, the unabridged history of these early provisions does not clearly compel
the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude conduct originating out-of-state. This
underscores the wisdom, in this instance, of the rule that resort to legislative history is proper
only where the statutory language yields an absurd or illogical result. Town o f Yarmouth v.

4 A copy o f the report, with the accompanying legislative debate, is attached to Microsoft’s motion.
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Moulton, 1998 ME 96, 710 A.2d 252, 254. Of course, no such illogic or absurdity appears here.
IV.

THE MAINE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS CONSISTENTLY
INTERPRETED THE MINI-SHERMAN ACT AS APPLICABLE TO
CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE STATE WHICH RESTRAINS OR
MONOPOLIZES TRADE OR COMMERCE IN MAINE.

The Attorney General is the agency charged with the enforcement of Maine’s miniSherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 et seq. The statute may be enforced criminally or civilly.
On the civil side, the Attorney General may seek injunctive relief and civil penalties, or may
bring an action for damages on behalf of the State in its proprietary capacity, or as parens patriae
on behalf of Maine indirect purchasers injured as a result of conduct violative of sections 1101 or
1102. Accordingly, the Attorney General’s interpretation of the mini-Sherman Act merits some
measure of deference. See Davric Maine Corp. v. Harness Racing Commission, 732 A.2d 289,
293, 1999 ME 99 (in context of appeal of agency action, rule is that agency interpretation is
entitled to great deference, unless statute compels contrary result).
Over the decade since the enactment of Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer, the Attorney
General has consistently interpreted the mini-Sherman Act to apply to extraterritorial conduct
which operated to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in Maine. See e.g., State o f Maine
v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation, No. 90 CIV 8065, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990) (copy of
Complaint attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 and 1102 on the basis, inter
alia, of agreements entered into outside Maine between Sandoz, a Delaware corporation and
codefendant Caremark, Inc., a California corporation; see at <|f(][ 1, 6-7, 40, 76-83); State of New
York v. Reebok International, Ltd., No. 95 CIV 3143 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1995) (copy of
Complaint attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101 on a factual basis which
presumably included extraterritorial conduct; see a t f l 8-11, 17, 36-37); State of Maine v.
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American Optometric Association, No. 98-515-CIV-J-21C (M.D. Fla. May 29, 1998) (copy of
Complaint attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101 on the basis, inter alia, of
extraterritorial conduct; see e.g. a t® 15-19, 102,106, 113, 144-145); State of Connecticut v.
Mylan Laboratories, Inc., No. 1:98CV03115 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1999) (copy of Amended
Complaint joined by Maine Attorney General attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. §§
1101 and 1102 on the basis, inter alia, of extraterritorial conduct; see e.g. a t® 8-12, 30, 37,116117).
Of the actions cited, Sandoz and Reebok were settled; while American Optometric and
Mylan are still pending. In Mylan, significantly, the court has explicitly ruled that the Attorney
General possesses parens patriae authority to bring suit under the mini-Sherman Act on behalf
of indirect purchasers. F.T.C. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 99 F. Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999).5
Thus, at least since the adoption of Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer in 1989, the Attorney
General has consistently interpreted the mini-Sherman Act as applicable to extraterritorial
conduct. In view of the plain language of the statute, as well as the legislative history reviewed
above, we submit that this interpretation is reasonable, and should be adhered to by this Court.
A grant of Microsoft’s motion, conversely, would drastically restrict the scope of the
Attorney General’s antitrust enforcement program under the mini-Sherman Act. Essentially, the
Attorney General would be empowered to bring suit under the statute only on the basis of purely
intrastate conduct. By nullifying Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer, such a ruling would likewise
sharply restrict the scope of antitrust relief available to the State as well as to Maine consumers.

5 Although strictly speaking, the issue presented on this motion is one of first impression, it is perhaps not without
significance that this Court seems to have tacitly acknowledged the applicability of sections 1101 and 1102 to
extraterritorial conduct in the context o f an indirect purchaser class action. Karofsky v. Abbott Laboratories, CV-951009 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. C’ty, Oct 16, 1997) (Saufley, J.), 1998-1 Trade Cas. 172,121 (denying class
certification on other grounds).
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It is worth recalling that under Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers have no cause of action under
the federal Sherman Act. California v. ARC America Corp subsequently harmonized the state
and federal systems into a complementary whole, affording relief to indirect purchasers under
state law and to direct purchasers under federal law. The interpretation urged by Microsoft
would destroy that harmony and leave Maine indirect purchasers who suffer the impact of illegal
anticompetitive conduct in the national marketplace without a remedy.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae the Maine Attorney General urges the Court
to deny Microsoft’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated:

ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

FRANCIS ACKERMAN
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Assistant Attorney General
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APPLICATION OF MAINE
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
INTERVENE AS AMICUS CURIAE

The Maine Attorney General now applies to intervene in this litigation pursuant to
M.R.Civ.P. Rule 24 for the limited purpose of filing a memorandum of law as amicus curiae to
address a novel issue raised by Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s pending Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. Microsoft Corporation challenges the applicability of Maine’s mini-Sherman
Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 et seq., to conduct which, while occurring entirely outside Maine’s
borders, is alleged to have caused anticompetitive effects within the State.
The Attorney General, as the agency charged with antitrust enforcement duties under
Maine law, respectfully begs leave to be heard on this issue as amicus curiae. Microsoft’s
argument contradicts a decade of established jurisprudence. Moreover, if adopted as the law of
this State, Microsoft’s interpretation of the statute would drastically narrow the scope of the state
antitrust enforcement, as well as the scope of antitrust relief available to the State and Maine
consumers. The importance of the issue addressed, and the Attorney General’s interest therein,
appear more fully in the memorandum of law submitted herewith for the Court’s consideration.

Dated:

ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

FRANCIS ACKERMAN
Chief, Public Protection Unit
Six State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333
(207) 626 8800
Bar No. 2125
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MAINE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW AS
AMICUS CURIAE

The Maine Attorney General begs leave to submit this memorandum of law as amicus
curiae to address a novel issue raised by Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) in the context of
its pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Microsoft challenges the applicability of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§
1101 et seq., to conduct which, while physically occurring outside Maine’s borders, is
nevertheless alleged to have caused anticompetitive effects within the State. Indeed, Microsoft
maintains that only conduct of a purely intrastate nature falls within the purview of the statute.
This position, however, would contradict more than a decade of established state antitrust
jurisprudence, and is founded on erroneous premises.
The Attorney General is the agency charged with antitrust enforcement duties under
Maine’s mini-Sherman Act. In addition, the Attorney General represents the State in its
proprietary capacity in antitrust suits, and represents Maine consumers in such suits in his role as
parens patriae. We view this issue as a matter of deep concern. If Microsoft’s interpretation of
the statute should prevail, the scope of the state antitrust enforcement, as well as the scope of
antitrust relief available to the State and Maine consumers, would narrow drastically.
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I.

INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiffs in this class action are Maine purchasers of computer systems manufactured by
Microsoft. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they have paid higher prices for Microsoft
products than they otherwise would have as a result of certain conduct by Microsoft which, they
charge, constitutes both unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization in violation of the
Maine mini-Sherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 & 1102. Although the Complaint does not say
so, the lawsuit is brought pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104, which provides, in pertinent part, that
“[a]ny person ... injured directly or indirectly in its business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section 1101, 1102 ...
may sue for the injury in a civil action” (emphasis added). The Plaintiff class in this action
presumably consists largely (if not entirely) of indirect purchasers (i.e., those who purchased
Microsoft systems from third parties rather than directly from Microsoft).
As defined in the Complaint, the Plaintiff class is limited to Maine-domiciled individuals
and entities. Further, Plaintiffs’ proof may be expected to show that Microsoft products are
widely available for purchase in Maine, and that at least some (no doubt most) of Plaintiffs’
purchases of Microsoft products were consummated in Maine. If it is assumed, for purposes of
the pending motion, that the allegations of the Complaint are true, there appears to be no dispute
between the parties with respect to two propositions: (1) the conduct attributed to Microsoft
occurred entirely outside Maine; and (2) that conduct resulted in anticompetitive effects harmful
to purchasers within the State.
Against this background, Microsoft’s pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
raises a single issue. Microsoft argues that Maine’s mini-Sherman Act by its terms does not
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apply to conduct which occurs outside the State, even if the anticompetitive harm resulting from
that conduct is felt within the State.
In advancing this argument, Microsoft relies straightforwardly on the statutory provisions
which respectively prohibit (1) “every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce in this State” (§ 1101) (emphasis added); and (2) monopolization (or
attempts to monopolize) “any part of the trade or commerce of this State” (§ 1102) (emphasis
added). Microsoft reads this language to limit the purview of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act to
conduct which occurs entirely within the State. There is no contention that this interpretation of
the statute is required by any federal constitutional or statutory provision. Instead, Microsoft
relies exclusively on the language and legislative history of the statute itself. The issue presented
is therefore one of simple statutory construction.
In the sections below, we explain that the plain language of the statute clearly authorizes
suits, like the present litigation, by Maine indirect purchasers damaged by a manufacturer’s
conduct occurring outside the State. Under accepted canons of statutory construction, that plain
language controls. Even if it is nevertheless deemed appropriate to excavate the legislative
history of the relevant enactments, we submit that nothing in that history compels a contrary
result. Moreover, the Attorney General’s longstanding interpretation of a statute he is mandated
to enforce, which here squarely supports Plaintiffs’ position, is entitled to some measure of
judicial deference. Finally, it bears consideration that a grant of Microsoft’s pending motion
would drastically narrow the scope of state antitrust enforcement as well as the scope of antitrust
relief available to the State and to Maine consumers.
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II.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF MAINE’S MINI-SHERMAN ACT
AUTHORIZES SUITS BY MAINE INDIRECT PURCHASERS DAMAGED
BY A MANUFACTURER’S CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE STATE.

The language of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act is unambiguous. “Any person injured
directly or indirectly” by conduct violative of sections 1101 or 1102 “may sue for the injury.”
Under section 1101
Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce in this State is declared to be illegal.
Clearly, the sale of computer systems to individuals and entities domiciled in Maine, especially
when such sales are consummated in Maine, constitutes trade or commerce “in this State.”
Moreover, regardless of the location where it is entered upon, a contract or combination which
damages Maine indirect purchasers by causing them to pay supracompetitive prices for computer
systems certainly affects trade and commerce in this State adversely, i.e., restrains it. Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 1314 (defining “restraint of trade” to include practices which
“hamper or obstruct the course of trade or commerce as it would be carried on if left to the
control of natural economic forces,” including practices which “affect prices ... to [the]
detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods”; citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 [1940]).
Similarly, section 1102 unambiguously declares:
Whoever shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine
and conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce of this State shall be guilty of a Class
C crime.
Again, it can hardly be denied that the sale of computer systems in Maine constitutes a part of
the trade or commerce “of this State.” Moreover, as in section 1101, the phrase “in this state” or
“of this state” modifies “trade or commerce” rather than the targeted conduct.
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In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege monopolization of a worldwide market, by means of
conduct which, for example, inhibited the development of competing products. Amended Class
Action Complaint (Rf 19, 26. Maine is, of course, part of this worldwide market. Surely, wherever
perpetrated, conduct which inhibits competing products from reaching this worldwide market,
including Maine, operates to monopolize a part of the trade or commerce “of this State.”
Accordingly, the plain language of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act, on its face, authorizes
suits by Maine indirect purchasers damaged by a manufacturer's conduct outside the State. The
situs of the conduct complained of is quite irrelevant, provided that the conduct has the effect of
restraining or monopolizing trade or commerce in Maine. Put differently, conduct that restrains
or monopolizes a wholesale market also inevitably restrains or monopolizes downstream retail
markets. Since restraint and monopolization of trade and commerce in Maine is squarely alleged
on the face of the Complaint, Microsoft’s motion necessarily fails.
Ignoring the plain language of the statute, Microsoft’s motion is built on a precarious
foundation consisting of carefully selected excerpts from the legislative archaeology of various
enactments dating back to 1913. This approach is impermissible, since, in the absence of
ambiguity, the plain language of the statute is controlling. Home Builders Association of Maine,
Inc. v. Town o f Eliot, 2000 ME 82, 750 A.2d 566, 569 (court will look to legislative history only
where ambiguity exists); Dunelawn Owners Association v. Gendreau, 2000 ME 94, 750 A.2d
591, 595 (where plain language resolves issue, court will not attempt to infer contrary legislative
intent). However, even if Microsoft’s resort to legislative history were appropriate, it would still
be unavailing, for the reasons explained below.
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III.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MAINE’S MINI-SHERMAN ACT
DOES NOT IN ANY EVENT SUPPORT MICROSOFT’S RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF ITS APPLICABILITY.

Microsoft’s attempt to limit the applicability of Maine’s mini-Sherman Act to purely
intrastate conduct is founded primarily on excerpts from legislative debate which preceded the
original enactment of sections 1101 and 1102 in 1913. The Legislature has, of course, revisited
the statute on several subsequent occasions.
The present litigation is an indirect purchaser class action, brought pursuant to an
amendment to section 1104 which was passed in 1989. P.L. 1989 ch. 367. In construing the
statute as a harmonious whole, see Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, 719 A.2d 523, 524, it
behooves us to begin by examining the intent of this more recent enactment.
A.

Maine’s Illinois Brick Repealer Was Broadly Intended To Afford
Redress To Maine Indirect Purchasers For Overcharges Traceable to
Manufacturer Misconduct Outside, As Weil As Within the State.

The indirect purchaser amendment, enacted without floor debate in 1989, “amendfed]
Maine law to provide Maine citizens and corporations with a right to sue a manufacturer for
damages suffered as a result of a manufacturer’s violation of state antitrust laws, regardless of
whether the citizens or corporations are direct or indirect purchasers from the defendant.” L.D.
1653, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989). Consistent with this expansive explanation, nothing
in the enactment itself, or in the supporting presentation of Commissioner (now Senator) Susan
Collins suggested for a moment that the purpose was to provide a remedy only for restraints or
monopolizations of trade accomplished by means of purely intrastate conduct.
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To the contrary, both the Statement of Fact and the Commissioner’s testimony1
expounded the significance of the indirect purchaser amendment in terms of its jurisprudential
context. Specifically, a decade prior to the enactment, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that
indirect purchaser lawsuits were not authorized by the federal Sherman Act. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Thus, while direct purchasers could sue under federal law for
antitrust injury, indirect purchasers damaged by pass-through overcharges could not. Although a
few states legislatively authorized indirect purchaser suits under state antitrust statutes by means
of so called “Illinois Brick repealers”, doubts persisted as to the constitutionality of the repealer
provision. Those doubts were resolved by California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93
(1989), which made clear that states were free to provide redress to indirect purchasers in the
context of state antitrust statutes.
As both the Statement of Fact and the Commissioner’s testimony emphasize, L.D. 1653
was proposed and enacted in response to ARC America’s invitation, as Maine’s Illinois Brick
repealer. Very simply, the new law was intended to provide to Maine indirect purchasers the
remedy denied them under the federal Sherman Act by Illinois Brick, namely, a right to sue
manufacturers to recover overcharges incurred as an indirect result of the manufacturer’s
anticompetitive conduct.
If the bill’s sponsors or Commissioner Collins had believed they were proposing to
provide a remedy to indirect purchasers which permitted recovery of overcharges only where
those overcharges were incurred as a result of anticompetitive conduct perpetrated by businesses
or persons physically located in Maine, such a drastic limitation would surely have been
explicitly noted. Indeed, with manufacturing in Maine in steep decline over the past half
i

Copies of the L.D. and the Commissioner’s testimony are attached.
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century, it seems fair to suggest that such a limitation might well have reduced the utility of the
amendment to the vanishing point.
In amending section 1104, then, the 1989 Maine Legislature obviously intended to allow
suits by or on behalf of Maine indirect purchasers against out-of-state manufacturers on the basis
of their conduct outside (as well as within) the State, to the extent that its harmful effects were
felt by persons within Maine. Since the Legislature enacted no simultaneous amendments to
sections 1101 and 1102, it must have believed that these provisions were already broad enough
to reach such extraterritorial conduct.
Moreover, it is equally clear that this belief was already current at least a dozen years
earlier, when the Legislature acted to revitalize then-moribund state antitrust enforcement by
increasing the penalties which could be brought to bear for violation of sections 1101 and 1102.
P.L. 1977 ch. 175, enacting L.D. 347 as amended (108th Legis. 1977). As Senator Conley stated
in support of the bill: “This law is going to give greater protection to the small businessman
against the out-of-state corporations, which are the least likely to share our ethics.” Legis. Rec.
633 (1977).2 Microsoft’s argument is thus at odds not only with the plain language of sections
1101 and 1102, but also with the Legislature’s own understanding of the scope of these
provisions, as evidenced in the legislative history of subsequent amendatory enactments, first in
1977, then again in 1989.
Importantly, Arnold v. Microsoft, Jefferson Circuit Court, Division Eleven, No. 00-CI00123 (Opinion and Order dated July 21, 2000) (appended to Microsoft brief at Tab G), cited by
Microsoft, actually supports our contention that the primary purpose of indirect purchaser

2 Copies o f these materials are attached to Microsoft’s Motion.
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statutes is to expand the scope of state antitrust law to include conduct with extraterritorial
origins. In Arnold, Judge McDonald-Burkman clearly understood that if Kentucky had enacted
an Illinois Brick repealer statute such as Maine’s, private plaintiffs would have been able to sue
for “[a]nticompetitive acts performed largely or totally out of state, against third parties, causing
injury to Kentucky residents . . .

Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Because Kentucky law (unlike

that in Maine) does not expressly authorize indirect purchaser suits, the court dismissed
plaintiffs’ claim, noting pointedly that the Kentucky legislature had had two decades in which to
add indirect purchaser language (as Maine did) but failed to do so. Id. This Kentucky case thus
confirms the obvious —that indirect purchaser legislation such as Maine’s 1989 amendments are
intended to remedy monopolistic conduct at the wholesale level because that conduct inevitably
distorts in-state markets, regardless of whether such conduct occurred inside the state or
elsewhere.3

3 In addition to Maine, other states to explicitly repeal the Illinois Brick rule to allow private indirect purchaser
actions include California, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §
133.18(1) (a) (West 1989); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3 (Michie 1995); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 445.778(2) (1989); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (West 1995); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-801(b) (1994); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (Michie 1994); the District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-4509 (1996); and North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-08.1-08(3)- (4) (1989). Other
states have enacted more limited provisions: Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 1993) (allowing
only attorney general suits on behalf of indirect purchasers, see Gaebler v. New Mexico Potash Corp., 676 N.E.2d
228,221 (111. App. Ct. 1996)); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11- 209(b)(2)(ii) (1990) (allowing
government suits); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (1992) (allowing parens patriae action with set-off
for previously awarded damages); and Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-14(a), (b) & (c) (1993) (allowing attorney
general suits and nonclass indirect purchaser actions for single damages).In addition, some state courts have even
interpreted their pre-Illinois Brick consumer protection and antitrust statutes to allow private indirect purchaser
actions. In some of these cases the allegedly anticompetitive conduct occurred primarily outside the state. See, e.g.,
Hyde v. Abbott Labs., 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 478 S.E.2d 5 (N.C. 1996) (interpreting state
counterpart of Sherman Act to authorize indirect purchaser suits); McLaughlin v. Abbott Labs., No. CV 95-0628
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Yavapai Co. July 9, 1996) (same); Blake v. Abbott Labs., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) *][ 71,369
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1996) (same); Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So.2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(interpreting state deceptive practices act to authorize indirect purchaser suits).
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Against this background, Microsoft’s heavy reliance on legislative pronouncements
concerning the original versions of sections 1101 and 1102, as enacted in 1913, is far from
compelling.
B.

The Legislative History of the 1913 Enactment Is Ambiguous.

Upon careful examination, the legislative discussion preceding the 1913 enactment does
not support Microsoft’s contention that the Legislature clearly intended to exclude from its
purview conduct by entities not located in Maine even where the inevitable results of that
conduct significantly impact Maine consumers. Certainly it is possible, as Microsoft has done,
to highlight carefully selected excerpts inferentially supporting its restrictive interpretation of the
statute. However, it is significant that all of the legislative debate cited by Microsoft focussed on
a proposal to conduct an investigation of the coal trade in Maine, and preceded the drafting (and
therefore could not have construed) the language of the bill which was ultimately enacted and
codified in sections 1101 and 1102. The unexpurgated record, accordingly, presents a much more
complex, finely nuanced picture than the one painted by Microsoft. Ultimately, given its full
context, the history of the 1913 enactment supports a more expansive view of the underlying
legislative purpose.
Maine’s original antitrust law was enacted in 1889, a decade before the federal Sherman
Act. P.L. 1889 ch. 266. In pertinent part, this statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any firm or incorporated company, or any
number of firms or incorporated companies, or any unincorporated
company, or association of persons or stockholders, organized for
the purpose of manufacturing, producing, refining or mining any
article or product which enters into general use or consumption by
the people, to form or organize any trust, or to enter into any
combination of firms....
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By 1913, however, concerns had arisen that this original antitrust provision was too
narrow in scope. In particular, a harsh winter and soaring coal prices statewide led Senator
Morey of Androscoggin to call for an investigation. Senator Morey presented anecdotal
evidence suggesting that the price spikes were caused by a territorial allocation agreement
among coal dealers in Maine. Legis. Rec. 53 -54 (1913). Other legislators were skeptical.
Senator Steams of Oxford, for example, believed it far more likely that the high prices Maine
was experiencing had their source at the minehead in Pennsylvania, or elsewhere “far beyond the
confines of Maine,” and thus “far beyond the reach of any investigation which we may be able to
have set in motion.” In Senator Steams’ view, the logistics and expense of such a far-ranging
investigation were “a matter more properly to be handled by the federal government.” Id. 52.
Senator Hersey of Aroostook was also concerned that Maine’s 1889 antitrust law was not
broad enough to reach the conduct on which the investigation would focus.
Coal is not a product that is mined or refined or manufactured in
the State of Maine, therefore] it does not come under the trust
laws of Maine, and [under the 1889 law] we have no authority over
any combination that is formed outside the State of Maine for the
purpose of mining or manufacturing coal.
Id. 55. Senator Hersey was rightly concerned that, because the 1889 law applied solely to
manufacturers, refineries and mining companies, Maine antitrust enforcement could not reach
anticompetitive conduct among coal dealers within the State. He also seems to have held the
view that the 1889 law could not reach a combination formed outside the state, in all likelihood
because the language of the relevant provision took the form of a regulation of the ability of
persons within the state to enter into certain types of business organization.
In response to these concerns regarding the limitations of the 1889 law, the Legislature
undertook to broaden the scope of state antitrust enforcement. Indeed, in Senator Morey’s view,
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the central purpose of the proposed investigation was to offer recommendations in this regard.
On this basis, he won an expression of “warm support” from Senator Hersey. Id. 55 -56.
Accordingly, the investigation was authorized and conducted by a legislative committee
chaired by Senator Morey. In its extensive report, the committee concluded:
[n]ot only the mine owners and middlemen or brokers, but also the
retailers, have been sharers in a greater or less degree in this
increased cost of coal to the consumer . . . . the statutes of this
State prohibiting combinations and agreements in [restraint] of
trade are very limited in their scope, and to end of providing
adequate legislation to prevent all future agreements and
combination of every kind in the nature of monopolies or in
restraint of trade, your committee presents herewith the
accompanying bill. . . .
L.D. 479 (76th Legis. 1913) at 25 (emphasis added).4 Of concern to the committee,
therefore, were combinations among mine owners, middlemen and brokers out-of-state, as well
as among retailers within the State. The committee’s goal, as far as possible, was “to prevent all
future agreements and combinations of every kind in the nature of monopolies or in restraint of
trade.” From this expansive language, it seems eminently fair to conclude that the legislative
purpose in 1913 in enacting the Morey bill, whose language survives today in sections 1101 and
1102, was to broaden and lengthen the reach of Maine antitrust enforcement both within and
outside the state. L.D. 464 (76th Legis. 1913), enacted as P.L. 1913 ch. 106.
At a minimum, the unabridged history of these early provisions does not clearly compel
the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude conduct originating out-of-state. This
underscores the wisdom, in this instance, of the rule that resort to legislative history is proper
only where the statutory language yields an absurd or illogical result. Town o f Yarmouth v.

4

A copy of the report, with the accompanying legislative debate, is attached to Microsoft’s motion.
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Moulton, 1998 ME 96, 710 A.2d 252, 254. Of course, no such illogic or absurdity appears here.
IV.

THE MAINE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS CONSISTENTLY
INTERPRETED THE MINI-SHERMAN ACT AS APPLICABLE TO
CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE STATE WHICH RESTRAINS OR
MONOPOLIZES TRADE OR COMMERCE IN MAINE.

The Attorney General is the agency charged with the enforcement of Maine’s miniSherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 et seq. The statute may be enforced criminally or civilly.
On the civil side, the Attorney General may seek injunctive relief and civil penalties, or may
bring an action for damages on behalf of the State in its proprietary capacity, or as parens patriae
on behalf of Maine indirect purchasers injured as a result of conduct violative of sections 1101 or
1102. Accordingly, the Attorney General’s interpretation of the mini-Sherman Act merits some
measure of deference. See Davric Maine Corp. v. Harness Racing Commission, 732 A.2d 289,
293,1999 ME 99 (in context of appeal of agency action, rule is that agency interpretation is
entitled to great deference, unless statute compels contrary result).
Over the decade since the enactment of Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer, the Attorney
General has consistently interpreted the mini-Sherman Act to apply to extraterritorial conduct
which operated to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in Maine. See e.g., State of Maine
v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation, No. 90 CIY 8065, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990) (copy of
Complaint attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101 and 1102 on the basis, inter
alia, of agreements entered into outside Maine between Sandoz, a Delaware corporation and
codefendant Caremark, Inc., a California corporation; see at j[f 1, 6-7, 40, 76-83); State of New
Yorkv. Reebok International, Ltd., No. 95 CIV 3143 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1995) (copy of
Complaint attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101 on a factual basis which
presumably included extraterritorial conduct; see at M 8-11, 17, 36-37); State of Maine v.
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American Optometric Association, No. 98-515-CIV-J-21C (M.D. Fla. May 29, 1998) (copy of
Complaint attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101 on the basis, inter alia, of
extraterritorial conduct; see e.g. at *J[f 15-19, 102, 106, 113, 144-145); State o f Connecticut v.
Mylan Laboratories, Inc., No. 1:98CV03115 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1999) (copy of Amended
Complaint joined by Maine Attorney General attached - alleging violations of 10 M.R.S.A. §§
1101 and 1102 on the basis, inter alia, of extraterritorial conduct; see e.g. at

8-12, 30, 37, 116-

117).
Of the actions cited, Sandoz and Reebok were settled; while American Optometric and
Mylan are still pending. In Mylan, significantly, the court has explicitly ruled that the Attorney
General possesses parens patriae authority to bring suit under the mini-Sherman Act on behalf
of indirect purchasers. F.T.C. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 99 F. Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999).5
Thus, at least since the adoption of Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer in 1989, the Attorney
General has consistently interpreted the mini-Sherman Act as applicable to extraterritorial
conduct. In view of the plain language of the statute, as well as the legislative history reviewed
above, we submit that this interpretation is reasonable, and should be adhered to by this Court.
A grant of Microsoft’s motion, conversely, would drastically restrict the scope of the
Attorney General’s antitrust enforcement program under the mini-Sherman Act. Essentially, the
Attorney General would be empowered to bring suit under the statute only on the basis of purely
intrastate conduct. By nullifying Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer, such a ruling would likewise
sharply restrict the scope of antitrust relief available to the State as well as to Maine consumers.

5 Although strictly speaking, the issue presented on this motion is one of first impression, it is perhaps not without
significance that this Court seems to have tacitly acknowledged the applicability of sections 1101 and 1102 to
extraterritorial conduct in the context of an indirect purchaser class action. Karofsky v. Abbott Laboratories, CV-951009 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. C’ty, Oct 16, 1997) (Saufley, J.), 1998-1 Trade Cas. H72,121 (denying class
certification on other grounds).
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It is worth recalling that under Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers have no cause of action under
the federal Sherman Act. California v. ARC America Corp subsequently harmonized the state
and federal systems into a complementary whole, affording relief to indirect purchasers under
state law and to direct purchasers under federal law. The interpretation urged by Microsoft
would destroy that harmony and leave Maine indirect purchasers who suffer the impact of illegal
anticompetitive conduct in the national marketplace without a remedy.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae the Maine Attorney General urges the Court
to deny Microsoft’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
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